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I. INTRODUCTION

T

wo sixteen-year-old sweethearts in Florida have consensual sex and memorialize it in a photo that they
share only with each other.
A slightly drunk seventeen-year-old in New
York has oral sex with another moderately inebriated seventeen-year-old at a party. He takes a photo of the act with his cell
phone and sends his trophy to his cousin in Ohio.
A fifteen-year-old girl in Nebraska removes her clothes
while talking to her eighteen-year-old boyfriend on Skype, hoping it makes him “hot” for her.
A sixteen-year-old Oregonian youth takes a picture of his
erect penis next to some referential object because, well, he can.
Only one of these scenarios depicts unlawful conduct that
will subject its actor(s) to felony
child pornography charges that
carry mandatory sex offender registration requirements for at least
ten years; it is the first scenario,
which is arguably the most benign.
Though every state has criminalized what we consider as child
pornography, the individual state
proscriptions of these depictions
have resulted in a dysfunctional
system of law enforcement where
there is uncertainty as to what and
whom we are trying to regulate.
As a consequence, many young people are unaware that their
conduct may be a crime. Nationally, legal action has been prolonged, inconsistent, and the subject of much literature.1
Typical child porn legislation forbids anyone to create,
record, photograph, film, develop, reproduce, or publish any
material that depicts a minor in a state of nudity or engaging
in certain explicit sexual acts.2 Though this material has been
described as “self-exploitation,”3 or “autopornography.”4 those
words describe the method of production and do not create a
requirement that the person creating the photo actually be the
subject of the image.
Most of this literature has considered the phenomenon of
“sexting,” a portmanteau combining “sex” and “text,” which
4

describes the act of taking a sexually explicit or suggestive
photo, most often by cell phone camera, and then transmitting
the image via the text message feature that is offered as part of
the service plan. Commentator Yvonne Roberts is credited with
the first use of the term in an article in 2005, though that story
had nothing to do with juveniles.5
The scope of this Article envisions a not too distant future
in which sexting is only one method, and not the predominate
method, of how images will be created and shared among young
people. It was until recently that online chats with webcams
were replaced by the cell phone as the primary means of creation and distribution of these images. Now websites like ChatRoulette6 provide the forum for random exhibitionism with
strangers. Soon applications such as FaceTime7 will replace
sexting and be the standard feature to create real time streamed
images from a hand held device such as the iPhone. Whereas a
sexted image can easily be saved
on the device, and Skyped or Webcam images can be anticipated and
recorded, new technology is making it far more difficult to discover
the material and prove criminal liability arising out of its existence.8
Yet all of this material, when it
depicts lewd images of minors, is
subject to traditional child pornography prohibitions that criminalize
all aspects of the creation, possession, and transmission of material
that contains sexual depictions of people under a specified age.9
Though celebrity sexting keeps it at the forefront of the public
interest, this Article addresses a greater scope of activity than
sexting.
Prosecutions for the creation and distribution of explicit
images of minors have often resulted in drastic punishments
with enduring sexual registration requirements, and thus are
often litigated through state and federal courts in an effort to
clear names and restore reputations.10 Some offenders are offered diversion programs and other non-formalized resolutions.11 Several writers argue this production of e-porn between
consenting juveniles is not an unlawful act.12
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This Article contributes an important and timely analysis
of the increased tension between the First Amendment and
technological innovation, especially as recent Supreme Court
decisions have reinforced the protection against Government
regulation of speech and expression. This analysis is imperative
for our understanding of the limitations of current approaches to
a phenomenon made possible by seemingly limitless methods
of creation and transmission. A number of States have enacted,
or are considering, legislation that accepts the self-made images from enforcement under the traditional child pornography
statutes.13 Some legislation creates affirmative defenses to child
porn prosecution where the circumstances clearly depart from
exploitation and abuse.14 Through examining judicial decisions
and legislation, a new standard should be considered when
consensual and non-exploitative conduct poses a legitimate
basis for criminalization. This measure creates a safe haven for
depictions of conduct that is lawful for the engaged subject,
even when those images contain explicit sexuality; criminality
will instead be predicated upon the use or intended use of the
material.
Parts I and II of this Article introduce the reader to the
nature of the problem and why it matters that we address the
First Amendment implications upon the status quo which allows
for severe sanctions to be imposed upon immature people who
often have no idea that they are breaking any laws, and who are
showing no inclination to abandon this mode of communication. A consideration of existing statutes reveal a pastiche of
laws that often criminalize the depiction of lawful conduct, and
are anchored by the chronological age of the actors, making distinctions often where there are no differences in the behavior of
the actors, but are of enormous consequences to the participants.
The examples at the beginning of this section are but four of
many fact patterns that can result in the discordant application
of law when any one of the numerous methods of creation and
transmission depict erotica involving teens.
Part III of this Article will attempt to quantify the numbers
of young people who are impacted by this discussion. It will
identify the significant number of teens who use cell phones
and send sexually explicit texts. When added to the number of
computer users overall, it becomes obvious that child pornography laws or new legislation focused on texting already impacts
a great deal of young people.15 This section will conclude with
a survey of the “legal age” to have sex in each state, since that
is the definitive metric in the proposals made in this Article.
Part IV considers the conception of child pornography
jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of the United States and
demonstrates how two recent First Amendment cases will require legislative policymakers to discern between creation and
transmission of sexually explicit material that is intrinsic to a
criminal act and similar material that possesses some intrinsic
social value. No doubt the weightiest of these opinions is United
Criminal Law Brief

States v. Stevens,16 which affirms limitations on content-based
censorship, and has been said to be the most important First
Amendment opinion in a decade.17 More recently, Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association18 amplified the significant
First Amendment protection bestowed upon minors when they
create, distribute, or consume speech.19
Part V will explain why consensual and non-exploitive
sexting and Skyping20 do not result in the risks of harm to children that justify the pervasive use of child pornography laws to
regulate the sexual expressions of juveniles. Much of the early
literature is directed toward connecting sexting with traditional
child porn because both harm children.21 This Article discounts
these arguments and returns the focus to the original intent of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which established the basis for
excluding child pornography from the umbrella of First Amendment protection.
Part VI creates a boundary within which a significant
amount of sexually oriented speech and expression would be
shielded from prosecution. This portion argues that lawfully
created, explicit imagery should not be criminalized unless it is
used in violation of existing law or is itself integral to criminal
conduct. The fact that in many states it is lawful to engage in
sexual conduct with someone while the possession of a nude
photograph of that person is unlawful reflects societal confusion
in sexual matters.
This section identifies a number of criminal offenses in
which the explicit material is proximately linked to the prohibited act. The most generic prohibition against the creation,
possession, or distribution of child porn would be a statute that
contains a mens rea requirement that the actor subjectively believe the material to be child pornography. More specific are
a number of statutes that can be engaged when someone creates, possesses, or distributes this matter with the intent to stalk,
harass, menace, or injure the reputation of another. Likewise,
prosecutions should occur when the material is used to blackmail or extort from, when used for commercial purposes, or
when used to entice another to do an unlawful act. The prosecuting attorney is in the best position to apply these nuanced
laws to fact patterns so that formal prosecution is predicated
upon admissible evidence that sufficiently proves the elements
of the offense.
Part VII concludes that technology has outgrown conceptual child pornography jurisprudence, but not traditional
First Amendment values. A number of statutes contain conditions that provide young people with affirmative defenses to
charges, or which reduce potential penalties for those who do
sext.22 Whether sui generis or the amendment of existing laws,
or through evolving jurisprudence, these efforts are laying the
groundwork for a legislative or a judicial distinction between
creating porn and sexting.

5

II. THE DYSFUNCTION OF CURRENT
LAW AND POLICY
Two factors account for the disconnect between the use of
traditional child pornography prosecution and the regulation of
teen behavior. First, there is no consensus among legislatures
as to what or who should be regulated. Second, as discussed in
Part IV, though the compelling interest in child safety is axiomatic, those interests, as defined by the Supreme Court, are not
reflected in the breadth of traditional legislation.

A. THE AGGLOMERATION OF CURRENT STATE LAW
At what age is a person lawfully allowed to engage in sexual intercourse
or any of the acts that comprise sexual
conduct? One of the most troubling
consequences of current child porn laws
is the unmitigated criminalization of depicting something that is perfectly legal.
The notion of criminalizing conduct—
and by extension criminalizing the depiction of that conduct—is much easier
to swallow than the dilemma presented
to sexters. Assuming that a participant
is doing something legal, the next question to consider is how old either or both
of the participants must be in order to
lawfully memorialize any explicit sexual image?

It is far too simplistic
to suggest that

adolescents are

incapable of making
consensual sexual
choices in all
instances.

1. Specific Applications of the
Laws Regulating Sexual Expression
There are substantial differences among the states with respect to what age consensual sexual activity is lawful, and there
is similar variety in the definitions of the age which the subject
of the image must be to avoid prosecution by one who creates,
possesses, or distributes the image. When does the creation of a
sexually explicit image violate the law; when does the transmission of a sexually explicit image violate one of these laws; and
when does possession of a sexted image violate the law? These
are all open questions among the states.
While there are several federal statutes protecting children
from sexual predators, none impose a minimum age limit on the
sexual act.23 Rather, the age at which one may lawfully engage
in sexual conduct24 is controlled by an individual state’s statute.
Such statutes determine the statutory age over which consensual
sexual conduct is lawful with anyone who is likewise of legal
age, with the most common age set at sixteen.25 Eight states
have set the age at seventeen,26 and twelve states have set the
age at eighteen.27 At the other end of the spectrum, legislatures
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in nearly every jurisdiction have set age limits at which a child
is too young to ever consent to engage in sexual conduct.28 A
sex act with one who has not yet attained this minimum age is
considered statutory rape.29
Traditional age based limitations on meaningful consent
have been criticized as intransigent and out of touch with the
reality of an increase in sexual activity among younger people,
who are exposed to sex and sex education at earlier ages than
generations past.30 It is far too simplistic to suggest that adolescents are incapable of making consensual sexual choices in all
instances. The sexually experienced fifteen-year-old may be far
more acutely aware of the implications of sexual intercourse
than her sheltered cousin who is beyond
the age of consent.31
Understanding the state-by-state
variations in the age of consent is further complicated by a recent trend that
accommodates a middle group of young
people who are conditionally allowed
to engage in consensual sex with others who are within a certain range of
years older or younger than their partner.32 These statutes are often referred
to as “Romeo and Juliet” laws.33 For
instance, a number of statutes prohibit
sex with someone who is more than four
years younger than the older actor. 34
Every state sets a minimum age
under which the subject of the image,
whether referred to as a minor, a child
or a juvenile, becomes illicit, irrespective of the degree of explicitness depicted in the image. It is this
element of the statutes that most directly creates the legal trap
used to capture sexters.
The great majority of states define this age as being under
eighteen years of age.35 Three states prohibit possession of images of those under seventeen,36 and seven set the age at under
sixteen.37 Delaware alone prohibits imagery depicting anyone
under eighteen years of age.38 Most states are consistent with
respect to prohibitions against possessing, creating, and distributing child porn, but idiosyncrasies are not uncommon.39 The
legislature in some states made a provision for an affirmative
defense that the actor can claim he reasonably believed the
subject of the image was of legal age.40 Typical sexters obviously know the age of the subject, but it is hardly reasonable
to think successive possessors or disseminators will give the
matter any thought.41 The issues become even more complicated
when interstate digital transmissions are routed through multiple jurisdictions.
Yet the macédoine is also subjected to the quality or nature
of the photograph itself. With one exception,42 child pornograFall 2011

phy statutes are not conditioned upon a finding of obscenity,
nor are there requirements of any active sexual conduct. Passive posing will often be enough to meet child porn prohibitions where the subject is below a certain age, so long as it is
explicit.43 The typical statute will prohibit the possession, distribution, production or creation of an image of a minor engaged
in sexual conduct.44 The term sexual conduct is usually defined
to include easily identified activities such as intercourse or masturbation, but also some rather ambiguous concepts such as nudity,45 or a lewd and lascivious display of genitals.46 Genitals
are often defined with specificity, right down to the imaginary
line above the nipple,47 but nudity does not necessarily mean
without clothes on!48

2. Sex Offender Registration
Sex offender registration requirements exacerbate the
problem. Since juvenile records are often confidential and will
not likely expose a teen with a record, the most adverse impact of delinquency adjudication is subjection to the requirements of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification
Act (“SORNA”),49 whose application varies wildly among the
states.50 SORNA publicly stigmatizes individuals well past the
age of majority.
State practice is inconsistent among the jurisdictions with
respect to who should register, the duration of the registration,
and the ability of the public to access this information. Thirteen
states only require registration of juveniles who have been convicted as adults for any of the qualifying crimes.51 More states
require registration for any juvenile adjudicated delinquent for
the designated offenses, and for the most part these registrations
are for a period of at least ten years.52 A smaller number of states
actually allow a judge to make a determination as to whether the
juvenile should be subject to registration requirements,53 while
the remaining states have no registration requirements for these
types of offenses.54 Critics argue that the mandatory nature of
the laws is over inclusive; that so many offenders are required
to register that it ironically prevents the public from protecting
itself against those who pose a real recidivist threat.55 Digital
technology makes it likely that in the future there will be an
even greater number of registered offenders, so that the registers’ efficacy will diminish exponentially for those seeking to
protect against sex offenders.
The examples at the start of this Article are stark depictions
of the consequences of the impractical, and sometimes senseless, application of traditional child porn statutes to the displays
of teen sexual behavior, especially when instantaneous dissemination via modern technology is involved. There is no rational
basis to effect such disparate treatment of expressions of teen
sexuality; the sexual thought processes of a sixteen-year-old in
Iowa are no different than her peer in Virginia.
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Four examples of teen behavior introduced in this Article,
none of which stretch the bounds of credulity. It may surprise the
reader to know the example that is clearly in violation of state
law is the most explicable of the group. The sixteen-year-old
sweethearts, though lawfully permitted to have sex, are prohibited from memorializing it, even to the exclusion of all others.56
They may also be required to register as sex offenders for a period of ten years.57 Assuming there is no claim that intoxication
vitiated consent, the two seventeen-year-olds from New York
may lawfully engage in the act, and take a photo,58 but they run
the risk of prosecution by sending it to Ohio, as does the cousin
who receives it.59 The young lady from Nebraska and her boyfriend are saved by a recent amendment to the Nebraska statute
that presumably was meant to accommodate the issue by including affirmative defenses to the traditional child porn statutes.60
In her case, evidence of the closeness in age, voluntary creation
of the image, and the limited distribution can be offered as a
defense to child pornography charges.61 Finally, a condition of
the statute that requires the photo be possessed or controlled for
the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the
person or another person62 will probably leave the consequences
for our sixteen-year-old Oregonian in the hands of his parents.

III. COMPUTERS, CELL PHONES, AND TEEN USERS
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY
The primary vehicle of communication referenced in this
Article is the cell phone which, for all relevant purposes, functions similarly to any computer, though the facts and conclusions herein could apply to all transmissions of the subject
material, by whatever means developed. Still, the ubiquitous
cell phone best symbolizes the potential for the creation of explicit imagery.
Depending upon one’s generation, the introduction to the
cell phone is associated with Gordon Gekko in the 1980s film
Wall Street63 or Zach Morris in the 1990s television show Saved
By The Bell,64 each of whom was armed with the Motorola DynaTAC 8000X.65 The unit weighed two pounds, and was ten
inches in length, not including the flexible whip antenna, retailed for $3,995, and had a battery life of one hour which required a ten hour charge to sustain.66
Among teens, age is the most important variable in phone
ownership. In 2009, about half of those aged twelve to thirteen
owned cell phones, while surveys claimed seventy-two percent
owned them by age fourteen.67 Of course, it is difficult to define
who actually “owns” the device in a typical multi-phone family.
United States cell phone users sent about 2.1 trillion text messages in 2010, a nearly fifty percent increase over the previous
year.68
7

B. QUANTIFYING THE CLASS OF AFFECTED YOUNG
PEOPLE
The first articles about sexting69 reference a survey that was
of arguably suspect methodology,70 which addressed two very
important years that most state laws exclude from the legal definition of a juvenile.71 Unfortunately, most of the early media accounts reported statistics from this poll which concluded nearly
twenty percent of teens were sending sexually explicit images
via cell phone.72
Since then, at least three other studies have been conducted,73 finding significantly different (and less) amount of
sexters.74 The survey that exactly identifies the subject age
group75 opines that as few as four percent of the sampled population engage in the practice.76
A valuable statistic in understanding the breadth of the
issue would be the calculation of juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent77 for production, distribution, or possession
of child pornography. The difficulty with obtaining this data is
two-fold. First, there is the problem of confidentiality of juvenile records of such adjudications. Most jurisdictions shield any
juvenile records from public access, and there is no consensus
about the nature and degree of sex offenses that are subject to
reporting under the SORNA.78 Second, not all states require
youth convicted of certain sex offenses that would fall within
the subject of this Article to register, and not all registries are
accessible by the public.79 Further, some of these offenders are
being held accountable for the harmful and exploitive conduct
that traditional child pornography laws are meant to punish.80
To the observer, the statutory violation reads the same.
Since the number of sexters is difficult to pin down, the potential impact of sexting laws on the population of juveniles is
presumptive in consideration of the sheer volume of cell phone
users among the age group. When adding computer sexters and
“Skypers” to the mix, by any measure, there are a substantial
number of young people impacted by the uncertainty and inconsistency inherent in the application of child pornography laws.

IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. INTRODUCTION
When one pictures the average “child pornographer,” one
does not imagine a seventeen-year-old student body president
photographing himself after gym class. However, case law
somehow places the teenage sexter in a jail cell with the very
people from whom the Court has professed to protect him. The
camera phone has caused the average fifteen-year-old studying
for an Algebra quiz, and sneaking a quick suggestive text to her
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beau, to fall unwittingly into the abyss that is child pornography. In order to fully appreciate the confusing legal issues that
surround the teenage sexter, one must understand the framework of pornography law and its evolution.
Before the Court came across the likes of Paul Ferber 81
or Clyde Osborne,82 prosecutions of child pornographers were
based upon the test for obscenity established in Miller v. California..83 Explaining that the states have an established interest
in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene84 material
when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or
of exposure to juveniles,85 the Court set out to define the applicable standard to determine whether material is obscene.86

B. CONCEPTUAL CHILD PORN LAW
1. New York v. Ferber87
In 1982, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
the criminality of distributing videos depicting underage children engaging in acts of a pornographic nature should be analyzed under the test for obscenity or under a different standard.88
Paul Ferber co-owned an adult bookstore and sold two videos
depicting young boys in various acts of masturbation to undercover police officers.89 The state of New York indicted him on
two counts of promoting an obscene sexual performance and
two counts of promoting a sexual performance of a child; the
jury convicted him on both counts of promoting a sexual performance of a child, which did not require proof of obscenity.90
On appeal, a single question was presented: “To prevent
the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct
for commercial purposes, could the New York State legislature,
consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit the dissemination
of material which shows children engaged in sexual conduct,
regardless of whether such material is obscene?”91 Answering
affirmatively, the Court categorically denied child pornography
safe harbor within the First Amendment without considerations
of obscenity.92
Ferber established that even if the images in question are
not legally obscene, their production and distribution can be
outlawed because of the state’s interest in preventing child exploitation and the overwhelming majority of child pornography
is created in a manner that is an act of despicable child abuse.93
To fit with the Ferber analysis, this author suggests that a third
party, perhaps the pedophile that preys on and abuses children,
must literally be in the background, having had an integral part
in either its production or dissemination. The opinion clearly
distinguishes the reasons child pornography is in the special
class of unprotected speech, as it is proximately linked to the
criminal act of child abuse.94
Thus, one can conclude that if there is no abuse, if the children are not 1) made to engage in the sexual conduct and 2) the
Fall 2011

materials are not used for commercial purposes, the case is not
controlled by Ferber. In Ferber, the Court addressed one issue,
because a single question was presented. The acts occurring in
the teenage sexter’s photos are not intrinsically related to the
sexual abuse of children in any of the ways the Court in Ferber
proffered.95 There is no coercion, exploitation, or abuse, and
there is no third party behind the camera preying on the sexual
acts of a child. The scope of this conduct rarely includes the
sale for money or other commercialization of the images. There
is no selling, advertising, or promoting of these photographs
that could implicate the state’s interests as per Ferber. The iniquitous motivation that should be required to impose criminal
liability on the creator is absent. Thus, there is no record of
child abuse to destroy. Further, the dissemination is generally done with the
foolhardy and youthful indifference for
modesty and consequence, unlike that
same teen who flashes a passing car,
wears a scanty bathing suit, or gets labeled with loose morals.
Prophetically, the Ferber Court
noted that whatever miniscule unconstitutional applications of the statute
that did occur could be cured through
case-by-case analysis if the fact situations to which its sanctions, asserted,
may not be applied.96 It is essential
for the Courts to step in and create a
boundary between Ferber material and
the sexted image. Consensual and selfproduced images present one application that does not conform to the state’s
compelling interests in protecting children from adult predators. The Court,
arguably, has left room to decide fact
situations, such as those created by our
“tech-crazy teens,” which send a significant portion of the 75
billion texts per month.97
Finally, there is a huge difference between the means of
production and distribution in 1982 and those means existing
in 2011. A person who chose to create, format, and distribute
forbidden material in Ferber’s era would make a far greater
commitment in time and energy than a similar actor today who
could take a picture and send it to hundreds of people around the
world in the time it takes to read this sentence aloud. For these
reasons, Ferber’s continued relevance can be debated.

pornography to include private possession of these materials.99
The state of Ohio convicted Clyde Osborne for a violation of its
Revised Code Section 2907.323, which proscribes possession of
any material that shows a minor in a state of nudity.100 Specifically, authorities discovered four photographs, each of a nude
adolescent male posed in a sexually explicit position.101
Here, the Court held the possession of this material bore a
causal relationship to criminal conduct similar to Ferber in that
it created a market or economic motive which was an integral
part of the production of the child porn.102 It further found the
statute would serve to destroy the permanent record of abuse,
which once obliterated could no longer haunt its participants or
be used by pedophiles to seduce other children into sexual activity.103 However, Osborne’s impact on
the creation of images by minors goes
well beyond embellishing Ferber. The
Court approved the State’s construction
of the term “state of nudity” to include a
lewd exhibition depicting graphic focus
on the genitals of the subject.104 This
construction directly impacts the legality of erotic photos that could be characterized as nothing more than posing.105
Every state now includes these graphic
displays within the statutory definition
of sexual conduct.106 Often these are the
non-obscene, yet graphic and highly
sexual poses and activities that make
up the high tech flirting that sexting has
come to represent.107
The Court conceded that on its
face, the Ohio statute prohibited nude
depictions of minors, which, standing
alone constituted protected speech.108
As construed, however, application of
the statute exempted from punishment
actions that were morally innocent, only preventing sinister possession or viewing of the described material for prurient purposes.109 However, in its opinion, the Court did not use the term
“morally innocent” to describe the protected images, opting instead to state, that by its construction, Ohio chose not to penalize those who view or possess innocuous photographs of naked
children.110 The majority wrote, “so construed, the statute’s
proscription is not so broad as to outlaw all depictions of minors in a state of nudity, but rather only those depictions which
constitute child pornography.”111 This shows that the Court recognized, even in 1992, that not all pictures of unclothed minors
are child pornography.
There are a number of reasons that these images are created,
that could not be considered as immoral and can rationally be
classified as artistic, humorous, or legitimate social interaction.

There are a number

of reasons that these

images are created, that
could not be considered
as immoral and can

rationally be classified
as artistic, humorous,
or legitimate social
interaction.

2. Osborne v Ohio98
A few years after the Ferber Court found that production
and dissemination of child pornography was unprotected and
criminal, the Court was asked to extend the prohibition on child
Criminal Law Brief
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The Court’s language clearly is not an invitation to create a
new standard to measure these images, but is used as a method
of distinguishing between that which is categorically child pornography and that which is not. This distinction is helpful in
classifying the voluntarily self-created image as either innocuous and protected, or exploitive and prohibited.
The child pornographer begets a product of no social value
and his motivations are for no social good. Though the sexted
image quite often is similar in content to child pornography, it
is created for completely different reasons and often reflects
significant social value to its subjects. The self- produced image
can be sent as an expression of affection, an attempt at humor,
or a method of social interaction. It can also be appropriate enticement to engage in a relationship or a lawful sexual act. A
number of surveys attempt to explain the motivations that drive
young people to this level of exhibitionism.112 In reality, there
are many circumstances under which minors engage in the production and dissemination of sexually explicit images of themselves that involves varying levels of coercion and consent. 113
Efforts to list the reasons teens take nude photos of themselves
should also likely include “because they can.” It should be no
surprise that so many teens are unaware they are violating the
law when they create, possess, or disseminate these images.114
Another decade would pass before the Court again addressed child pornography legislation; by that time digital imagery revolutionized the creation and dissemination of these
depictions.

3. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition115
In 1996, Congress extended the definition of child pornography to include visual depictions, including computer generated images that were or appeared to be of minors engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.116 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court considered whether the government could extend the child pornography laws to sexually explicit images that
appear to depict minors but were produced without using any
real children.117 This could occur in two distinct ways: by using
adults who look like minors or by using computer imaging.
Fearful of suppression or criminal prosecution, a trade association for the adult entertainment industry, the publisher of a
book focusing on the lifestyle of nudists, a painter of nude art,
and a photographer who specialized in erotic images challenged
the statute in Federal District Court.118 On appeal, the question
presented was whether the federal regulation was constitutional
where it forbids speech that is neither obscene under Miller nor
child pornography under Ferber.119
At the outset, the Court declared that the proscribed images
“do not involve, let alone harm, any children in the production
process.”120 The indirect harm, Congress asserted, was that a
child reluctant to engage in on-stage sex acts may be persuaded
by watching other children who were “having fun.”121 Another
10

potential harm discussed was the possibility that pedophiles
would whet their own sexual appetites and increase creation,
distribution, sexual abuse and exploitation.122 Both of these arguments are used today to support the continued criminalization
of the sexted image.123
In a retreat from Ferber and Osborne, the Court held that
the government could not prohibit speech due to either its tendency to persuade viewers to commit illegal acts, or its utility
in child enticement because “[t]here are many things innocent
in themselves . . . such as cartoons, video games, and candy
that might be used for immoral purposes,” and that “[t]he mere
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
reason for banning it.”124 The rationale of whetting of sexual
appetites was similarly dismissed as being of unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts and not proven.125
Free Speech Coalition explained that the harm Congress
spoke of flowed from the content of the images, not from the
means of their production.126 Again referencing Ferber, Justice
Kennedy reiterated that where the images were themselves the
product of child abuse, “the state had an interest in stamping it
out without regard to any judgment about its content.”127 The
Court applied the Ferber rationale to mean that the production of the work, not its content, was the target of the statute,
and whether it contained serious redeeming value was of no
consequence.128
Thus, Free Speech Coalition reaffirmed that the First
Amendment protects speech where the content is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse.129 Nothing in this Article
advocates reviewing standards of obscenity as applied to either
adults or juveniles. But the Court at least recognizes that images
of certain acts, even among older adolescents are not necessarily obscene.130 Assuming the legality of the conduct depicted,
and the lack of abuse in the means of production, self-produced
imagery is likewise categorized as neither obscene under Miller
or child pornography under Ferber.

C. RECENT COURT DECISIONS IMPACTING THE
TRADITIONAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY JURISPRUDENCE
Over the past two terms, the Supreme Court has issued
opinions in three cases that should influence the course of events
when juveniles express themselves in sexual matters using
evolving technologies. Though none of these opinions deal directly with self-created imagery, they restate that whatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology the core First Amendment values of speech and expression maintain their preeminence and are applicable to minors.

1. United States v. Stevens131
In United States v. Stevens, the Court reiterated the value
of expression even when the content depicted conduct that
was unlawful.132 The statute at issue before the Court sought
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to criminalize the commercial creation, sale, or possession of
depictions of animal cruelty.133 However, it only prohibited the
portrayal of harmful acts, not the acts themselves, if the acts
were unlawful in the jurisdiction in which the portrayal was
created.134 Although the Court disposed of this case by declaring that the law was overbroad and that a substantial number
of its applications were unconstitutional judged in relation to
its plainly legitimate sweep,135 the opinion added value to the
sexting discussion because it addressed limitations on content
based censorship. It emphasized the need to link the speech to
criminal conduct, and also pointed out the problematic enforcement issues from state to state.136
Only recently has the significance of Stevens entered the
sexting conversation. One author calls the decision possibly
one of the term’s most doctrinally significant constitutional
opinions.137 Another flatly argues that after Stevens, the First
Amendment prohibits the prosecution of minors for sexting
once they have passed the state’s age of consent to have sex.138
In fact, by legally permitting minors to have sex in the first
instance, even prior to Stevens, a state undermines its own rational bases for criminalizing expression of that sexual activity
because it is absent a link to any crime. The rationale permitting young people to engage in sex acts while prohibiting them
from taking pictures of the act creates a distinction without a
difference.
The Stevens Court repeated the high value to be placed on
First Amendment protection for the content of images.139 The
eight to one majority labeled the Government’s claim that a
class of material be denied First Amendment consideration
when on balance the value of the speech is outweighed by its
costs to society as “startling and dangerous.”140 It reaffirmed a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment: the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.141
Of greater importance, the Stevens Court directly addressed
prior child pornography jurisprudence and gave some context to
the connection between the underlying conduct and the depiction. 142 This intrinsic relationship gives the speech a “proximate
link to the crime from which it came.”143 The Stevens Court
reconciles Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech Coalition to the
conclusion that the creation of child pornography is a criminal
act and the depiction thereof is the subject of a previously recognized and long-standing category of unprotected speech.144
Absent this connection between the image and the crime, First
Amendment protection is presumed.145
Intriguing is the concern expressed by the Stevens Court of
the problematic policy differences among the states as to what
is lawful or not.146 This was problematic because the relevant
statute did not prohibit all portrayals of animals being injured
or killed, but only those pictures created in states where the
method of inflicting the injury was itself unlawful.147 Likewise
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discordant child porn laws create bizarre legal results for juveniles who produce or disseminate images among the states.148
This occurs in the self-creation of cyber-porn when material
created lawfully in State A is transmitted by one click to State
B where the same photo is banned as child pornography, such
as in the New York party example given early on in this Article.
The weight of such dicta cannot be minimized when considering the substantial differences among the states as to who is
regulated and what conduct is proscribed in sexual expression
among young people.
The Court recognized that expression is not static, and it
indicated a willingness to consider other categories of speech
in relation to the Amendment’s protection, once they are identified.149 The Court has not had the opportunity to address images
created with the ubiquitous cell phone and the digital technology available today. Importantly, this evolution undermines the
method of production rationale upon which Ferber is based.
Though this calculus could change in the aftermarket, at least at
its inception, when young people voluntarily and consensually
produce imagery of lawful conduct, there is no victim and there
is no crime. This is the premise upon which a solution to the
problem, discussed in Part VI, is based.
Since the Court has made room for the exclusion of, as yet
unidentified, categories of speech from First Amendment protection, there is equal reason to believe it will make room for
the inclusion of a subset of expression that was previously categorically banned.150 After all, the Court has also shown some
sensitivity to the emerging behavior of those who choose to
utilize these gadgets to supplement or replace how they communicate.151 As the rapidly developing methods of producing
these images has evolved, so too has the expressive behavior
of the end users.

2. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association152
When California attempted to regulate the sale and rental of
violent video games to people under eighteen,153 its statute was
struck down by two lower federal courts,154 and the Supreme
Court affirmed in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.155 The Court’s Brown decision indicates the direction the
Court will take when considering whether the lawful, voluntary,
and consensual expressions of children are intrinsic to criminal child pornography, and therefore unprotected. In Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion, the Court noted California’s attempt
to create a new category of content-based regulation that is
permissible only for speech directed at children;156 calling the
effort “unprecedented and mistaken,” the Court reiterated the
significant measure of First Amendment protection accorded
to minors subject only to the state’s compelling interests and a
statute’s narrowly drawn restrictions.157 Arguably, video game
technology and cell phone applications have evolved on a similar track over the past twenty years.158
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Brown underscores Stevens’ importance by declaring it as
the controlling authority for its decision.159 The Court recognized that “[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that
preceded them, video games communicate ideas [and social
messages] . . . and that suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”160 There is no previously recognized and long-standing
category of unprotected speech associated with violence and
“the basic principles of freedom of speech . . . do not vary” with
a new and different communication medium.161 In short, while
a State may protect children from harm, that does not confer
unbound power to restrict the speech to which children may be
exposed.162
Unfortunately, some will probably latch on to Brown as
authority that a state merely needs to show how expression of an
idea harms children to regulate the content of that speech. Yet,
the Court did not hold that proof of a causal link between violent
video games and minors’ aggressive behavior would satisfy the strict scrutiny
a content-based restriction requires; it
acknowledged that it is a good place to
start the inquiry.163 However, in Brown,
the Court flatly declared that California could not show such a direct causal
link between violent video games and
harm to minors.164 Thus, an argument
that speech is harmful to minors is not
persuasive, as it prevents the Court from
recognizing a new “well-defined and
narrowly limited class of speech.”165
It is axiomatic that every aspect of
traditional child pornography is harmful, but the same cannot be attributed
to the consensual creation of pornography by all minors. The State must
specifically identify an actual problem
in need of solving and the curtailment
of speech must be actually necessary to
the solution.166 The values of the First
Amendment are impugned when the real reason for governmental proscription is the idea expressed, rather than its objective
effects.167
Minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection in matters of expression, even if a legislature
thinks the subject is inappropriate or unsuitable for them.168 The
section below on current legislative responses is illustrative of
what other conduct or actions will engage new statutory prohibitions, or will satisfy current regulations. These most probably
will include age grouping, surreptitious recording, and intention to harm.169 Looking forward, the idea that having sex is
acceptable, yet memorializing it is not, will be a tough sell for
legislators in trying to identify the problem, and will prove it

causes harm to the welfare of minors. Something more than a
generic claim that the conduct involves child pornography will
be required before sexters should be subjected to traditional
child porn laws.
The potential to create pornographic images has been available since the 1820s when the first permanent image was burned
on heliograph.170 Now, the ability to disseminate an image
around the world at the push of a button—easily, inadvertently,
and uncontrollably—has outgrown Ferber’s legacy.

3. City of Ontario v. Quon171
Though Stevens and Brown are relevant to the premise of
this Article as First Amendment cases, another recent opinion, unmentioned in any of the literature on sexting, requires
acknowledgement. In Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that a reasonable search of an employer
provided telephone to discern whether
employees were inadvertently being
required to pay out-of-pocket for business expenses did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.172 At first blush, one may
ask how this Fourth Amendment claim
is relevant to this topic, but the devil is
in the details.
While the Court kept its ruling
narrow and cautioned that these issues
must be decided on a case-by-case
basis, it acknowledged that “[r]apid
changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are
evident not just in the technology itself
but in what society accepts as proper
behavior.”173 Of particular importance,
the Court noted that “cell phone and text
message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider
them to be essential means or necessary
instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification.”174
Not unexpectedly, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that
“[a]ny rule that requires evaluating whether a given gadget is
a ‘necessary instrument for self-expression, even self-identification,’ on top of assessing the degree to which the ‘law’s
treatment of [workplace norms has] has evolve[d],’ is (to put it
mildly) unlikely to yield objective answers.”175
This language adds substance to the argument that in these
transmissions, the content or use of the innovation is not as important as the change in interpersonal dynamics the innovation
brings with it. Cell phones and other technology empower teenagers to assert their independence from adults. These advances
have been referred to as the “technology of the self.”176
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We have traveled this path before. Television had an impact on society that birthed a body of scholarship devoted to the
proposition that “the medium is the message.”177

V. HARM: THE DISPUTATION ASSOCIATED
WITH SEXTING
No one can claim the Government lacks compelling motivation to regulate the creation of child porn because of the
harms of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. Yet a body of
work attempts to dislodge self-created images from the category
of child pornography because the creation is consensual, nonexploitative, and absent of any sui generis risk of physical harm
in their creation.178
This discourse is driven by the complete lack of agreement
as to the nature and extent of the harm to the children in the
means of production of the images.179 The traditionalist theory
asserts that child pornography is harmful and thus not protected
by the First Amendment; that sexting is child pornography,
and therefore sexting is harmful and not protected by the First
Amendment.180 This Article rejects that theory.

A. HARM: THE CONNECTION TO FERBER
Few of us would risk disapprobation by suggesting that
sexting by minors is a good thing. But the ongoing debate seems
to characterize harm based on paternalistic, perhaps even religious, ideas that explicit display of the human body equates
with the harm sought to be repelled by the states and for which
the Supreme Court has created an exception to First Amendment protections.181
While attempting to compare and equate differing concepts
of harm, some authors seem to ignore that Ferber is directed to
the context within which the image is produced, not the content, of the image.182 That case does not permit suppression
of speech merely because it is harmful, it does so because the
speech is a criminal act. As Brown points out, determination of
a causal relation between the idea expressed and some harmful
consequence is a good place to begin the discussion of the government’s right to regulate the content of speech. 183 Professor
Leary and others contend that once the images are created they
produce “vast” social harm since they are used by offenders
to sexually assault children; they aid in the creation of juvenile sex offenders; and they further support the sexualization
and eroticization of children.184 Leary notes a study that found
nearly a quarter of juvenile sexual abuse cases, the abuser used
pornography to groom, legitimize, and demonstrate for the victim what to do.185
Likewise Professor Calvert adds to the list of the injuries
and harms from sexting: mental anguish in the form of embarrassment and humiliation when the images are disseminated
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without consent; harassment from others in the form of bullying; economic harm in the form of possible job loss or inability to obtain employment when the images are discovered;
parental punishment; criminal punishment; in school punishment; and social stigma.186 Noticeably absent from both authors
is any reference to the relationship between sexting and the
harms inherent in the invasion that accompanies the creation of
the photo in an actual case of child pornography. This damage
certainly includes physical, mental, and emotional trauma occurring while the image is being made. Likewise missing is any
acknowledgement that the sexted image is often created for a
valid, if immature, reason.
Authors have also latched onto the harm associated with
traditional child porn creation in that it creates a permanent record of the abuse of the child, which the states rightfully have
a compelling interest to eradicate.187 The future of any image
disseminated is out of control of the subject, and when the subject had no say in its creation, or the image is the product of
abuse, the permanent record argument is justified. But when the
subject image contains imagery that was made knowingly and
voluntarily by young people of lawful age to engage in the act
or conduct, this argument loses persuasiveness. In these circumstances, the lessons learned from self-created explicit images
are the equivalent to an imprudently placed tattoo.

B. HARM: DISCONNECTING FROM FERBER
There is pushback from authors where sexted photos are
often labeled child pornography by prosecutors while bearing
little resemblance to traditional notions of child pornography.188
Many of the harms chronicled are also associated with other
events in a juvenile’s life. As one author states,
Without the underlying criminal and coercive methods
of production, the circulation of self-produced images
does not subject the minor to the same type of continued invasion and exploitation of his or her sexual
autonomy and bodily integrity that is so degrading that
it can only be characterized as a continuation of the act
of sexual abuse.189
Nowhere in the news or the literature do we find physical
trauma or serial sexual exploitation associated in the creation of
the sexted image. “Although such images surely hold unlimited
potential for subsequent harm if disseminated without the minor’s consent, or even if the minor merely regrets having voluntarily distributed such images in the future, this harm is not
identical or even substantially similar to the harm suffered by
victims of child pornography.”190 Civil law provides remedies
by way of money damages and restraining orders to provide
relief to one who makes the image possible, yet who later feels
aggrieved when she feels it is improperly used.191
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The far-reaching effects of being registered as a sex offender arguably outweigh the embarrassment associated with
the possession and dissemination of self-taken pornographic materials.192 Employers routinely use the Internet for background
checks and are likely to discover a candidate’s sexual offense
history;193 the chance of personal identification by means of an
indiscreet image in cyberspace is more random. Far from being
forced or enticed into submitting to sexual acts to be recorded
in some fashion, with self-produced child pornography, it is the
minor who decides to create or distribute sexually explicit images.194 Who cannot look back to some regrettable conduct as
an epiphany that changed their view of personal responsibility
for their actions?
The claim that these images aid in the creation of juvenile
sex offenders is only true because we choose to label the conduct for juveniles. Assuming the offensive photos were taken
by, and of, a consenting pair of sixteen-year-olds, how do the
circumstances surrounding the act make it more criminal than
the circumstances of similar images contained in any mainstream, health and reproduction guide?195
Much has been said of the tragedy of the young woman in
Ohio, who some claim took her own life in a tragic response to
the publication of explicit photos she took for and sent to her
then boyfriend.196 Arguably, it was the consequence of her inability to handle the shame at the revelation of a most intimate
set of images combined with the abject cruelty at the hands of
her peers. It is quite a stretch to say her death was the direct
harm caused by sexting. The blame should not be so much on
the images as it should be on others’ reactions to them as a more
direct harm to her. Little discussion about the complexities of
teen suicide accompanies this tragic event.
Bullying is certainly a problem that can cause harm and it
has been the subject of national attention.197 The solution is to
regulate the conduct of the bully, however, not the content of the
message. Understandably, the Internet has expanded the reach
of the bully. Enforcement of existing laws against menacing and
other forms of harassment is the more logical route to holding
them accountable within the criminal justice system.
The lack of consensus on the quantity, nature, and degree
of harm created in the production or dissemination of depictions
of lawful conduct should devalue its weight in the discussion.
In Brown, the Court did not hesitate to reject the conventional
wisdom that exposure to violent video games causes harm to
minors.198 There is hardly a consensus as to how creating and
sending explicit self-created images correlates to children, or if
it harms them at all.

C. HARM: SEXUALIZATION OF CHILDREN
The sexualization of children is a concept that, as any parent knows, is as frustrating as it is unavoidable in our culture.
Whereas Professors Leary, Calvert, and others declare sexual14

ization to be a constituent part of the harm child porn laws is
meant to nullify, this Article distinguishes the harm caused by
the child pornographer from the harm associated with the sexualization of children.
The child pornographer causes physical, mental, and emotional damage through exploitation and abuse of a vulnerable
population, and his is an affliction borne of malady or malevolence. Sexualization may not cause any ill effect, and more importantly, it exists with the complicity of parents and friends;
it is an inescapable component of our environment, a rite of
passage that nearly all teens face. Even if they are somehow
victimized it can hardly be compared with the acts of a pervert
or pedophile. Of equal interest is the degree that sexualization of
the young has impacted the jurisprudence of child pornography.
As discussed below, we have gone to great lengths and strayed
far from Ferber in order to prove that the images are categorically child pornography.199

1. Societal Acceptance of Teen Sexuality
The intersections of the adolescent brain, our oversexed
society, and digital communication have created an accident
looking for a place to happen. The American Psychological Association found, “[v]irtually every media form studied provides
ample evidence of the sexualization [of women], including television, music videos, music lyrics, movies, magazines, sports
media, video games, the Internet, and advertising.”200 The scope
of digital technology creates a new level of control, enabling
even the most immature computer users access to unfiltered imagery and the ability to pass it on instantaneously and globally.
Findings in studies have shown “ that women more often
than men are portrayed in a sexual manner (e.g., dressed in revealing clothing, with bodily postures or facial expressions that
imply sexual readiness) and are objectified (e.g., used as a decorative object or as body parts rather than a whole person).”201
Additionally, “a narrow (and unrealistic) standard of physical
beauty is heavily emphasized . . . [and] these are the models of
femininity presented for young girls to study and emulate.”202
Though the volumes on female sexuality obliterate the dearth of
literature on the sexualization of boys and young men, the message is equally clear that a person’s value comes only from his
or her sexual appeal or sexual behavior, and a person is held to
a standard that equates physical attractiveness with being sexy.
“[A] person becomes sexually objectified—that is, made into a
thing for others’ sexual use, rather than seen as a person with
the capacity for independent action and decision making [and]
sexuality is inappropriately imposed upon a [child].”203
One need look no further than the musical craze of “boy
and girl bands,” and the likes of plainly sexualized children such
as Miley Cyrus, Justin Bieber, and Jaden Smith for examples
of this social trend. Only recently, Abercrombie & Fitch drew
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attention when it advertised the sale of padded bikini bras for
children under the age of ten.204
According to Judith Levine, author of Harmful to Minors:
The Perils of Protecting Children from Sex:
[W]e have arrived at a global capitalist economy that,
despite all our tsk-tsking, finds sex exceedingly marketable and in which children and teens served as both
sexual commodities (JonBenét Ramsey, Thai child
prostitutes) and consumers of sexual commodities
(Barbie dolls, Britney Spears).205
It seems hypocritical that adults permit access to magazines, movies, and cable television, web cams, computers, and
cell phones and yet are unwilling to take some responsibility for
the impact it has on children.

VI. A METHOD TO RECONSTRUCT CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS
As described below, a number of states are actually incorporating statutory language that will separate the “morally innocent” and “innocuous” imagery from the perverse and harmful
kind. Whether these laws have been effective in preventing the
creation and dissemination of this imagery is beyond the focus
of this Article, which is directed to the constitutionality of current child pornography laws once
the image is discovered. The practical enforcement of these laws
has been made exponentially more
difficult because of digital technology. On the other hand, once
discovered, these images leave
an electronic trail that often provides a prosecutor with irrefutable
evidence as to their production and
dissemination.
The ability to articulate circumstances that will determine
what conduct is legal and what
is not is at the root of American
lawmaking. One authority, the
prosecutor, is best suited to engage these statutes, not only on a
policy level, but in the determination that the evidence is sufficient
to meet the elements of these new
and hopefully improved statutes. The conventional child pornography laws cover a great deal of expression that is routine
for today’s youth and bears little resemblance contextually to
the material in Ferber and Osborne.

A. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REGULATE
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT IMAGES
Along with the conclusion that juveniles require different
treatment for their criminal activities is the concession that juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressure,”206 and “[o]nly a relatively small portion
of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into
adulthood.”207 The central importance of these factors is the underlying assumption of the juvenile court movement. A major
influence in public opinion on sexting was law enforcement’s
response to the conduct. The response was to use existing child
pornography law to formally prosecute juveniles and register
them as sex offenders for periods that went well beyond their
majority.208
No one gets elected to legislative office by promising to be
soft on crime. Paradoxically, by a recent count, more than half
of state legislatures have endeavored to amend their child porn
statutes to decriminalize or recriminalize sexting so as to reduce
the level of offense, the punishment for the conduct, and even
the formality of instituting criminal charges or sex offender
registration requirements.209 Additionally the media and law
enforcement have gone to lengths to warn children that, under
present conditions, sexting can only lead to disaster.210
The provisions of legislation proposed or enacted indicate
there is still no consensus as to any particular policy concern, but
the new statutes attempt to accommodate a number of issues—all directed to mitigating the perceived
harshness of using traditional child
porn law. Most new laws attempt
to mitigate the legal consequences
for the juvenile’s ribald manner of
expression. Some new regulation
takes a front-end approach and includes: subjecting the juvenile to
counseling, community service,
and life skills training;211 requiring
school districts to disseminate on
the dangers of distributing sexually explicit images via the cell
phone; requiring point of sale informational brochures when a cell
phone is purchased; and creating
diversion programs for offenders.212 To the extent these statutes
are directed toward prohibiting the
use of digital technology that is integral to criminal conduct,
they will be within the reach of Supreme Court boundaries on
the limit to free speech. To the extent the statutes criminalize
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the depiction of lawful conduct, they too will lose relevance and
enforceability. The lack of progress toward a unified legislative
solution suggests judicial intervention is necessary to identify
the class of cases that do not constitutionally qualify for prosecution as child pornography.213

B. PROPER PURPOSES LANGUAGE
Among the reasons the Ohio statute was validated in Osborne was the state court’s interpretation of “state of nudity”
that created an exception to the reach of the law where the creation and possession of the images was morally innocent.214
Thus, one can conclude, the only conduct prohibited by the statute is conduct that is not morally innocent, i.e., the possession or
viewing of the described material for prurient purposes.215 This
language decriminalizes photos taken by parents of their naked
babies in a bathtub, though literally the creation and possession
of these images violates the statute.
To that end new statutes, or amendments to existing statutes, have carved out criteria where the creation, possession,
or dissemination is not for prurient purposes, is not coerced or
exploitive, or commercialized, and thus is outside the ambit
of Ferber and Osborne. These enactments might not be artfully worded but certainly they are headed in the right direction. Judicial construction obviously will impact their efficacy
and constitutionality. One common thread appears to be found
in the addition of language to the statutory prohibitions that
clearly intends to accommodate actions that are consequences
of youthful indiscretion rather than perverse exploitation or
some other criminal act.216 They create exceptions to traditional
proscriptions that track pattern behavior common to sexting and
Skyping.
For example, one statute, typically, declares it unlawful to
knowingly possess a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, wherein the subject is a minor.217 If the possessor is over
nineteen years of age, the violation is a Class III Felony, and if
under nineteen years of age, a Class IV Felony.218 However, it
then goes on to state:
(3) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge made
pursuant to this section that:
(a) The visual depiction portrays no person other than
the defendant; or
(b)
(i) The defendant was less than nineteen years of
age;
(ii) the visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct portrays a child who is
fifteen years of age or older;
(iii) the visual depiction was knowingly and
voluntarily generated by the child depicted
therein;
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(iv) the visual depiction was knowingly and voluntarily provided by the child depicted in the
visual depiction;
(v) the visual depiction contains only one child;
(vi) the defendant has not provided or made available the visual depiction to another person except the child depicted who originally sent the
visual depiction to the defendant; and
(vii) the defendant did not coerce the child in the
visual depiction to either create or send the
visual depiction.219
This statute now protects the intended and lustful expression
of the fifteen-year-old Nebraska woman and her boyfriend described in the beginning of this paper.
North Dakota prohibits the surreptitious creation and
possession of an image without written consent from each
individual depicted in the image as well as the publication or
distribution of the sexually explicit image with the intent to
cause emotional harm or humiliation.220 It further makes it an
offense to publish the image, electronically or otherwise, after
the individual depicted in the image, or the parent or guardian
of that individual, expressly notifies the actor that they do not
give consent to having the image disseminated.221 Thus, under
this statute, though the underage sexters may assent to the creation and distribution of the image initially, a parent or guardian
can revoke that consent and further transmission will become
unlawful.222 This statute cleverly covers covert methods to obtain the images from unsuspecting subjects’ public displays of
sexual conduct at parties and sleepovers.223
If proper purposes can be articulated to rescue sexters from
punishment, then it follows that legislators can include improper
purposes for which a juvenile sexter can be sanctioned. Thus,
interdiction has been directed toward the malevolent use of the
imagery in the form of increasing the level of crime to a felony
offense for those who post the image with the intent to harm or
injure the reputation of the subject.224 One of the most outrageous misuses of sexted images occurred among teens in Wisconsin and resulted in extortion charges and a significant jail
sentence for the offender.225 Of questionable validity is the Louisiana statute, exempting passive posing, but not active conduct,
from the statute’s reach.226 On the one hand, Osborne authorizes
prohibitions of passive posing when the statute’s construction
encompasses the graphic focus on the genitalia, and on the other
sexual activity between the subjects might be completely lawful
and thus meriting the same legal treatment as posing.227

C. CIRCUMSTANCES INTEGRAL TO CRIMINALITY
To date, approximately half of the states have made efforts to redefine the boundaries between criminal behavior and
behavior which many feel is merely inappropriate for young
people.228 There are a number of ways to accommodate the
Fall 2011

legitimate reach of criminal prohibition without contradicting
core First Amendment values. One example is the use of traditional statutes, which are available to prosecute the creation
and transmission of self-created pornography when the circumstances involve conduct that has traditionally been subject to
statutory regulation.
In some states, recently enacted or pending legislation centers on the use of the explicit images to harass,229 to stalk,230 to
harm the reputation of another,231 or with the intent to cause
emotional harm.232 Likewise, existing prohibitions against extortion and blackmail create consequences for the unlawful use
of these depictions.233 These types of offenses existed before
technology so pervasively altered communication. Additionally, artfully worded statutes can be enacted to regulate or ban
surreptitious creation or the commercial use of these images.
Statutes can be enacted that prohibit enticement for sexual purposes where the age difference vitiates any reasonable claim of
consent by both parties, as well as the use of the depictions to
entice another into an unlawful act.234
Statutes require scienter, and a list of descriptive words, or
“operative verbs” that clearly describe a proscribed course of
conduct that sanctions speech that accompanies it. As used in
the statute, they must be surrounded by other words of the statute so as to define the determinative fact that must be proven.
This fact often will be the intention of the actor and, though it
may be difficult to prove, the statute’s requirements are clear
questions of fact. It may be difficult in some cases to determine
whether the requirements have been met, but courts and juries
every day pass upon the reasonable import of a defendant’s
statements and upon “knowledge, belief and intent.”235

D. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
One of the boundaries suggested here is a judicially created standard of whether the image was lawfully created at the
time and in the jurisdiction of its origin. If the image depicts
conduct that is lawful, then possession or transmission of the
image would be lawful, unless that possession or dissemination was integral to an articulated criminal act. The prosecution
would have the burden of proving the image was not lawfully
created, and the alleged delinquent could escape liability by
asserting the affirmative defense of its legitimacy. Subsequent
to that determination, the prosecution would be required to allege and prove that the creation, possession, or distribution of
the image was integral to other criminal conduct. This requires
statutory language that identifies the prohibited conduct and the
remaining determinations of questions of fact that are clearly
inherent to the adjudicatory process and the subjects of juries’
deliberations every day.
This result carves out a sanctuary for a significant amount
of speech that does not create the risk of harm that is unforeseeable to the creator of the image. As distasteful as adults might
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find this prospect, it has the important consequence of imposing self-responsibility upon those who would create these circumstances. Conversely, if the creation or consumption of the
material is inherent to criminal conduct, there is also a legal
consequence. “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable to them.”236
Most of the discussion in the literature has addressed the
policy decision of whether or not to prosecute under generic
statutory prohibitions, and there have been few efforts to propose what charges should be brought against minors who selfcreate sexually explicit material.237 The most obvious remedy
would be to add a mens rea element to the existing statutes238
—but that is easier said than done. Articulating the fact(s) which
must be proven to show knowledge and a subjective belief the
materials are child pornography will run a substantial risk of
over-inclusion as per the analysis in Brown.239
Professor Calvert identified distinctions between primary
and secondary sexting.240 Any further or secondary dissemination would be a violation of the law.241 This approach is not
feasible for two reasons. First, there would need to be consensus
as to whom (what age) would be subject to the statute, requiring
acceptance by all fifty states and territories of a Uniform Act.242
Additionally, analogous to Brown, some young people—as well
as their parents—may not object to the further distribution of
these “glamour” shots, especially if they are lawfully created
at the inception.
A third proposal distinguishes between traditional child
pornography and juvenile pornography.243 If the subject is a
minor, and the image was created and disseminated exclusively
to minors, the offense would not be taken as seriously as if it
involved an adult somewhere in the process.244 This method of
decreasing the gravity of and penalty for the offense underlies
most of the current legislative activity regarding sexting in the
United States.245 This effort does not solve the problem, but
merely renames it. It also does not take into account that one of
the actors may be an adult, but only days or weeks older than
his protégé.246 Ultimately, the issue to be addressed will be the
criminalization of depicting conduct which is lawful. It is no
less lawful by changing it from a felony to a misdemeanor or to
a status offense.247
Regardless of whether these new or amended statutes lower
the seriousness of the crime and consequences of a violation, or
whether they provide for defenses to the violation itself, clearly
they address the perceived injustice in the prosecution of sexting under generic child pornography statutes. Legislatures are
slowly moving in the right direction, but without consensus on
issues—such as at what age to regulate and what conduct to
separate from traditional notions of child pornography—tech-
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nology will increase the gap between existing laws and evolving
teen behavior.

E. THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE SHOULD BE EXCLUSIVE
It is essential that legislation aimed at protecting children
from allegedly harmful expression, no less than legislation
enacted with respect to adults, be clearly drawn and that the
standards adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are
governed by the law and those that administer it will understand its meaning and application.248 Since someone in authority
must initiate the process, the suggestion here is that the process
should begin with a review by law enforcement generally, with
the ultimate responsibility falling on the prosecutor to determine whether formal charging is supported by legally sufficient
evidence.249
Currently, many states utilize juvenile intake officers to
screen complaints and make determinations as to whether a delinquent act
was committed. They make decisions
that are fundamental to initiating formal proceedings in Juvenile Court,
and routinely with no oversight by the
prosecutor. This is in conformance with
the philosophy of the Juvenile Court
system, but it is misplaced when considering legal accountability for the
possession, creation, and dissemination
of sexually explicit images. Often these
people are not trained as lawyers, and
though they are quite skilled in screening most crimes, the nuanced legislation
initially requires legal analysis of facts
from the perspective of both the law enforcement and the accused.250 In some
states the young person who takes the
photo of herself is subject to a higher
degree of charges than the senders and
receivers of the photo, even if it is then
distributed to hundreds of others.251 The charging process requires early determination as to whether the facts constitute
prima facie evidence that a delinquent act was committed by
the accused juvenile.252 The character and quality of the image
will be assessed to determine whether the image is categorically
child pornography. Evidence of the subjective belief of the actor
in creating or possessing the image will be determined. The relationship among the young people who created, possessed, and
distributed the images will engage any statutory affirmative defenses. Issues of coercion, exploitation, or commercialization
must be considered in a consistent manner that is integral to any
criminal activity prosecution. This type of legal analysis is com-

mon, but too few other crimes are charged in the regular course
of the prosecutor’s business.253
The prosecutor should have the exclusive right to screen
facts obtained from law enforcement and other sources to determine whether those facts are legally sufficient for prosecution.254 If it is determined that the facts are legally sufficient, the
prosecutor should make the decision as to what route the matter will travel through the juvenile justice system.255 Ultimately
there will be one authority, accountable to the community, who
will make consistent decisions that contain a legally and factually sufficient basis upon which to proceed. This procedure has
a beneficial impact upon the prosecutor as it provides him or
her with an explanation to an irate parent as to why there will
be no criminal action initiated when the facts do not support
any charges arising out of the lawful and voluntary image their
daughter has created. Likewise, the public will be protected from a subjective
personal judgment by a prosecutor that
an image is immoral or inappropriate.
Recently the Third Circuit considered and granted a restraining order
against a criminal prosecution that has
drawn much comment in the literature
on sexting and the First Amendment.256
Plaintiffs’ daughter was depicted in
a photo, taken two years earlier when
she was thirteen, which depicted her
and another from the “waist up wearing
white, opaque bras.”257 Another Plaintiff’s daughter was shown wrapped in
a white, opaque towel, just below her
breasts, appearing as if she had just
emerged from the shower.258 In addition
to the usual list of prohibited sexual acts,
the Pennsylvania statute also banned the
“lewd exhibition of genitals or nudity if
such nudity is depicted for the purpose
of sexual stimulation or gratification of
any person who might view such depiction.”259 The prosecutor
felt he had a basis for threatening these charges because, in his
view, the images were “provocative.”260
Among the suggestions offered by Professor Leary in her
original article is a protocol for prosecutors to utilize in determining the best course of action in deciding whether to prosecute sexters or not.261 However, the idea expressed in this Article
is not on the discretion of the prosecutor to bring charges, but
rather the constitutional sufficiency of the charges brought.262 It
should satisfy those who believe the government has either the
right or the duty263 to intervene when children engage in foolish conduct that arguably causes them harm. Given the lack of
capacity universally associated with adolescence, it is important
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to address whether the goals264 of criminal or juvenile justice
are satisfied by the formal prosecution and sexual registration
of sexters.

VII. CONCLUSION
This discussion is not merely an academic exercise. Recent
census data shows there are roughly forty million people in the
United States between the ages of twelve and seventeen.265 Survey data show millions of those within this age group access
computers, webcams, cell phones, and smart phones. There is
no reason to expect our highly sexualized teen culture to reverse
course either technologically or in matters of personal propriety.
We have established arbitrary cut-off points, determined solely
by chronological age, to establish criminal liability among them,
while on the other hand we acknowledge irresponsible behavior
is “virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development…and that adolescents are overrepresented statistically in
virtually every category of reckless behavior.”266
The Supreme Court has never clearly defined “child pornography” and has not disturbed state statutes that regulate
any and every aspect associated with minors and sexual activity or nudity. Clearly though, it has created the legal authority for states to legislate upon their compelling interests. For
reasons expressed in this Article, ambiguity in the definitions
of those interests is blocking a consensus on the conduct which
can be regulated. We continue to rely on chronological age to
regulate the propriety of sexual expression. Sexting, Webcamming, Flickr, Facebook, Skyping, FaceTime and their counterparts have enabled a form of expression that bears little relation
to the subject of Ferber and Osborn. The Supreme Court has
clearly identified sexual abuse and child exploitation as evils to
be targeted, while also indicating that room needs to be made
for imagery that does not fall within these malevolent purposes.
In this tug of war, the army of juveniles and the sophistication of
their weaponry have nullified traditional rules of engagement.
It is plain that a blanket thrown over all aspects of juvenile
nudity or sexual hijinks covers too much ground, and laws that
generically ban explicit images of randomly aged people are
going to collide with both First Amendment speech and Fifth
Amendment Due Process claims. Efforts to overlay constitutional doctrine from Ferber and Osborne are out of sync with
the methods and motives of expression among the young in
2011. This has resulted in the operation of an internally incoherent system of child pornography laws.267
Some sexting is not consensual; it is coerced and exploitative, and requires a societal response through the juvenile or
adult justice system. A number of states have attempted to
specify circumstances when even the consensual creation and
transfer of the imagery is unacceptable because it is integral
Criminal Law Brief

to criminal activity. Sexual registration should still be considered after judicial evaluation, though in general the laws have
come under great criticism, particularly as they have impacted
juveniles. Some research shows that these laws have no impact
on sex offenders or their crimes.268 Other statutes consider a
number of factors in the creation of the photos to accommodate
legitimate forms of expression where the participants and the
images are innocent of any real and harmful threat to the safety
of children. This Article suggests one metric to be the legality of the conduct depicted. Initially, a statute should clearly
distinguish lawful conduct from unlawful conduct. Thus, assuming the image is not obscene, it is not child pornography if
it is created by or between people of lawful age to engage in the
conduct it depicts. Subjective legal assessments are pernicious
and have resulted in criminal charges such as those notoriously
brought in Pennsylvania only because a prosecutor decided the
images were “provocative.”269 Subjective measures of harm are
distracting rhetoric likewise leading nowhere.
Is sexting empowering or exploitative? When reasonable
people can differ as to whether it is exploitative, and it is unclear
as to who is being manipulated, entry into the criminal justice
process hardly seems productive in light of the current penalties.
This is especially true when considering the public branding
result, which lasts well beyond the act giving rise to the offense. Child pornography laws were created to combat perverse
exploitation and abuse of children by adults.
Though a number of distinguished authors have weighed in
on policy considerations, such factors are not central to this Article. This Article addresses the issue of what to prosecute, not
when to prosecute. The focus has been on the need to articulate
specific prohibitions, identifying an incriminating behavior that
allows the prosecutor, rather than a judicial officer, to decide
whether the case presents credible evidence of all the elements
that constitute the offense.
It is truly ironic that a jurisprudence that has affirmed the
social value of unrestrained communication about depictions of
gross or unlawful subject matter is criminalizing the communication of depictions of lawful matter. Given the numbers of
juvenile sexters there seems to be “something profoundly amiss
when a system of laws makes serious felony offenders of such
a large proportion of its young people.”270
Though few could have predicted the phenomena of sexual
Skyping or sexting, existing jurisprudence inadequately identifies who is to be protected and from what action protection is
needed. If these methods of expression create matters of compelling state interest then they need to be identified and articulated in statutes that combat the harm caused, protect the public
interest, and accommodate the special status of juvenile offenders who are likely to be rehabilitated. The Prosecuting Attorney
is in the best position to administer these laws at the policy level
and in the courtroom.
19

* I would like to express my deep gratitude to my colleagues at Case
Western Reserve University who were so generous with their time and
counsel.
1
See e.g., Don Corbett, Let’s Talk About Sext: The Challenge of
Finding the Right Legal Response to the Teenage Practice of Sexting,
J. INTERNET L. Dec. 2009, at 6 (noting the increase in laws related to
sexting); Mary G. Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography?
The Dialogue Continues – Structured Prosecutorial Discretion Within
a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 486 (2010)
(demonstrating the prevalence of literature on the topic).
2
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322 (West 2000) (exemplifying
of the type of statutory language more fully discussed in Part II below).
A complete list of individual state laws is at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
Child%20Pornography%20Statutory%20Compilation%206-2010.pdf.
3
See Mary Leary, Self Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate
Societal Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 4 (2008).
4
See John A. Humbach, “Sexting” and the First Amendment, 37
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 438 (2010).
5
Yvonne Roberts, The One and Only, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, (July 31,
2005), at 22 (“Following a string of extramarital affairs and several lurid
‘sexting’ episodes, Warne has found himself home alone, with Simone
Warne taking their three children and flying the conjugal coop.”).
6
CHATROULETTE, www.chatroulette.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
7
Apple, http://www.apple.com/mac/facetime/?cid=wwa-naus-segmac10-046&cp=wwa-segmac10-videochat&sr=sem (last visited October
10, 2011).
8
Live stream applications are much more spontaneous and can be
unanticipated by the receiver of the call. Recording of these conversations
also engages potential liability under Wiretapping Statutes. Unlike the
recorded phone call, the conduct addressed throughout this article is
known to every party involved and is consensual among them.
9
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322 (West 2000) (declaring
it illegal to “[c]reate, record, photograph, film, develop, reproduce, or
publish any material that shows a minor participating or engaging in
sexual activity, masturbation, or bestiality . . .”).
10
For instance, Philip Alpert, eighteen, was arrested for child
pornography when he sent a photo of his naked girlfriend, sixteen, to
others. Alpert engaged in “sexting” and got caught. Orlando police
charged Alpert with child porn. He pleaded no contest to the charge and
was tried and convicted. Alpert was sentenced and received five years
probation and must register as a sex offender in Florida until age fortythree. Alpert’s lawyer is working to get his name removed from the list of
sex offenders. Deborah Feyerick and Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen
on Sex Offender List, TIME (Apr. 7, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/200904-07/justice/sexting.busts_1_phillip-alpert-offender-list-offenderregistry?_s=PM:CRIME.
11
Jan Hoffman, States Struggle With Minors’ Sexting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/27sextinglaw.html.
12
See, e.g., Humbach, supra note 4, at 463-66 (noting the
inherent differences between adult-produced child pornography and
autopornography exchanged among teenagers); Stephen F. Smith,
Jail for Juvenile Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 515 (2008) (arguing that minors engaged in
the production and exchange of autopornography are either victims
or, alternatively, deserving of at least some form of punishment that
is considerably less harsh than adults engaged in the trade of child
pornography).
13
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 28-1463.03(5) (West 2010) (“It shall
be an affirmative defense . . . . if the defendant was less than eighteen

20

years of age at the time the visual depiction was created and the visual
depiction of sexually explicit conduct includes no person other than the
defendant.”).
14
Id. § 28-1463.03(6) (establishing an affirmative defense where the
creator and sender of underage autopornography had a reasonable belief
that the recipient of such content was a willing recipient).
15
Based upon 2010 Census data of young people aged thirteen through
eighteen, these surveys support the claim that the number of sexters alone
may be near our current prison population which exceeds 1.5 million. See
Key Facts at a Glance, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
glance/corr2.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
16
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
17
See, e.g., Antonio M. Haynes, Note, The Age of Consent: When is
Sexting No Longer Speech Incident to Criminal Activity?, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), draft available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1744648.
18
Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
19
See id. at 2738-39 (noting that California failed to establish a “causal
link between violent video games and harm to minors”).
20
Skype is a software application that allows users to make voice and
video calls and chats over the Internet. Skype is a peer-to-peer system
rather than a client–server system. See Skype Features, SKYPE, http://
www.skype.com/intl/en-us/features/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
21
See, e.g., Humbach, supra note 4 at 439 (acknowledging that sexting
and child autopornography has been deemed to be equally criminal as
adult-produced pornography for some time).
22
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463.03(6) (West 2010).
23
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (West 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (West
2011); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (West 2011).
24
A typical statutory definition of sexual conduct can be found in
Ohio, where “‘Sexual conduct’ means vaginal intercourse between a male
and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons
regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however
slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other
object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (West 2002).
25
See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)(1) (2010) (“A person is deemed
incapable of consent if he is: (1) [l]ess than 16 years old . . .); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.41.434(a)(1)-(2) (2010) (establishing different sexual abuse
standards for sixteen and eighteen year olds); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-127
(West 2010) (criminalizing sexual activity between those aged twenty
years or older, and those less than sixteen years of age); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-71(a)(1) (2010) (declaring sexual intercourse illegal where it occurs
between a person between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, and a person
more than three years older); D.C. CODE § 22-3001(3) (2001) (“‘Child’
means a person who has not yet attained the age of 16 years.”); IOWA CODE
§ 709.4 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 510.020 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 254 (2009); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM LAW § 3-307 (West 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, §
23 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520d (West 2010); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.345 (2009); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-64 (West 2010); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-501 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (West
2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT § 14-27.7A
(2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 297.04 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1111 (West 2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (2010); R.I.
GEN LAWS § 11-37-6 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.079 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-5
(2008).
26
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(3) (2009) (criminalizing
sexual activity where “[a]t the time of the commission of the act, the

Fall 2011

victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of
age and the actor is at least ten years older than the victim and is not
the spouse of the victim . . .”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 11-1.60 (2010); LA.
REV. STAT. § 14:80.1(A) (2010) (“A person commits aggravated criminal
sexual abuse if that person commits an act of sexual penetration or sexual
conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years
of age and the person is at least 5 years older than the victim.”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 566.068 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (West 2010);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.11 (Vernon 2009).
27
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (West 2010) (“A person
commits sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly
engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person who
is under eighteen years of age.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a)-(b) (West
2010) (“[For purposes of defining] [u]nlawful sexual intercourse . . . a
‘minor’ is a person under the age of 18 years and an ‘adult’ is a person
who is at least 18 years of age.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 770(a)(2)
(2010) (prohibiting those “thirty years of age or older” from engaging
in sexual activity with those younger than eighteen); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
794.011 (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1507 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-20-05 (2007); OHIO. REV. STAT. § 163.315 (West 2001) (“incapable
of consenting”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (West 2010); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-401.2 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (West 2008);
WIS. STAT. § 948.02 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-316 (2007).
28
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:3(III) (2011) (stating that a
person is guilty of a felony if such person has sexual contact with another
person under the age of thirteen, without exception); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-2(a)(1) (2011) (providing that a person is guilty of aggravated
sexual assault if that person commits an act of “sexual penetration” with
another person under the age of thirteen).
29
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (8th ed. 1999) (defining “statutory
rape” as “unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of
consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that
person’s will. Generally, only an adult may be convicted of this crime.”).
30
See Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation
of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 322 (1997) (noting
that about sixty percent of U.S. eighteen-year-olds are sexually active, and
that scholarly writing on the subject even suggests that “sex can play a
positive role in young people’s lives . . .”).
31
See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 674 (Cal. 1964).
32
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b) (2011) (declaring that “[a]
ny person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor who is not more than three years older or three years younger than
the perpetrator, is [only] guilty of a misdemeanor.”) (emphasis added);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506(b) (2011) (establishing that persons aged
thirteen to fifteen, and fifteen to eighteen, may not be statutory “victims”
depending on the age of their sexual partner).
33
‘Romeo and Juliet’ Law Changes Statutory Rape Definition, CBS
DFW (June 4, 2011) http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/06/04/romeo-andjuliet-law-changes-statutory-rape-definition/.
34
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.04354(1)(c) (West 2010).
35
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.127 (2010) (declaring that a person
is guilty of the crime of possession of child pornography for knowingly
possessing or accessing material that visually depicts a child under the
age of eighteen engaged in sexual conduct or, alternatively, through
manipulation appears to depict a child engaged in such activity); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 313(2)(g) (West 2008) (defining minor as “any natural
person under 18 years of age” for purposes of explicit materials); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 847.001 (West 2008) (declaring that an adult is a person
eighteen or older).
36
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-302(1) (2011) (“‘Child’ means any
person under seventeen (17) years of age”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-

Criminal Law Brief

196(2) (2011) (establishing that on charges of possession of child
pornography, a defendant may assert an affirmative defense that he made
(1) “a reasonable mistake as to age,” and (2) a reasonable good faith effort
to ascertain that such minor was seventeen years of age or older through
official documentation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1(B)(5) (2011)
(“‘Pornography involving juveniles’ is any photograph, videotape, film,
or other reproduction, whether electronic or otherwise, of any sexual
performance involving a child under the age of seventeen”).
37
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a) (West 2011);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 284(a)(1) (2011) (criminalizing the
possession, transport, access, purchase, and transport of sexually explicit
material when (1) it depicts a person under the age of sixteen, and (2)
the actor knows or had reason to know the person is not sixteen); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2c:24-4 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.11 (McKinney
2011) (“A person is guilty of possessing an obscene sexual performance
by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, [it] includes
sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.”)..
38
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 1103(b) (West 2009).
39
For example, the New York statute permits possession of a photo
depicting a sixteen-year-old, but forbids the creation or dissemination of
an image displaying a person under seventeen. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05
(McKinney 2001). Maine, likewise permits possession of an image of
a sixteen-year-old, but prohibits distribution of images depicting those
under eighteen. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 17-281(2) (2009).
40
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196(2) (2011).
41
After all, the physical transformation from boy to man is far more
ambiguous than the step from underage to of age.
42
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6a-3(a) (West 2007).
43
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West 2008) (“‘Harmful matter’
means matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying
contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and
is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently
offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”).
44
See, e.g., id. at (d).
45
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(3)(a) (West 2008) (“A person
may not [possess] . . . [a]ny picture . . . which depicts nudity or sexual
conduct . . .”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 29A (LexisNexis 2010).
46
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.071(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2011) (defining sexual
conduct to include “actual lewd exhibition of the genitals”).
47
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3501(4) (2001).
48
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the child porn
conviction of Steven Knox in United States v. Knox, where all the children
wore “bikini bathing suits, leotards, underwear, or other abbreviated attire
while they were being filmed.” 32 F.3d 733, 737 (3d Cir., 1994). “The
government conceded that no child in the films was nude, and that the
genitalia and pubic areas of the young girls were always concealed by
an abbreviated article of clothing.” Id. The Court held “that the federal
child pornography statute, on its face, contains no nudity or discernibility
requirement, that non-nude visual depictions, such as the ones contained
in this record, can qualify as lascivious exhibitions, and that this
construction does not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.” Id.
49
SORNA requires certain to juveniles register as sex offenders after
adjudication of a sex offense. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911-29 (2006). This
requirement applies only to juveniles convicted as adults and juveniles
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, so long as the juvenile is
fourteen years of age or older and is convicted of an offense similar to or
more serious than the federal aggravated sexual assault statute. See id. at
§ 16911(8).
50
In addition to offenses such as forcible rape, this statute covers any
offense involving a sex offense with a victim under the age of 12.
51
Lori McPherson, Practitioner’s Guide to the Adam Walsh Act,

21

20 NAT’L CENTER FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE UPDATE 2 (2007),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/practitioner_guide_awa.
pdf. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.100(3) (West 2010) (stating
explicitly that the requirements cover juvenile criminals); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-12 (West 2011) (stating implicitly that the requirements include
juvenile criminals); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1 (West 2011); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-4003 (West 2011); N.M.STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-4 (West
2005); N.Y. CORRECT. § 168-a (McKinney 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9795.2 (West 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-39-202 (West 2007); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 5401 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-2 (West
2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-301 (West 2011).
52
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(E) (2011) (permitting the
court to end any duty to register upon successful completion of probation
if the actor was under eighteen when the crime was committed); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290.001 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-22103(4) (West 2011) (applying registration requirements to juveniles
convicted for unlawful sexual behavior); DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 4121(a)
(4)(a) (West 2010) (requesting notification to community if convicted of
being a “sex offender”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 150-2 (A)(5) (West 2011)
(describing adjudicated to mean conviction for juvenile sex offenders);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(B) (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
28.723(b) (2011); MO. REV. STAT § 211.425 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 651-B-1 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (2008); N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-32-15 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-2 (2010); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (n)(i)(o) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.130 (West 2011); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 (West 2010).
53
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-356(e)-(f) (West 2009) (requiring
courts to conduct a hearing within ninety days of a registration motion,
at which a juvenile defendant shall be represented by counsel, where the
court will consider a number of factors related to the offense and the
defendant’s situation prior to deciding whether to order registration); IND.
CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-5 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-902(G) (West
2011).
54
See Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and SORNA, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabid=23045 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011)
(stating that a total of fifteen jurisdictions do not require adjudicated
juveniles to comply with sex offender registration requirements).
55
See Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How
the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences,
UTAH L. REV. 697, 712 (2008) (noting that registration laws only tend to
note the name of the crime for which a person was convicted, without
describing the “danger the offender really poses” to the community);
see also Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The
Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community Notification
Laws to Juveniles, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 163, 164 (2003) (observing that
empirical data supports a claim that recidivism rates for juvenile sex
offenders are lower than for their adult counterparts).
56
See A.H. v. Florida, 949 So. 2d 234, 237-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy that would permit
such activity).
57
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435 (West 2010). The law does not address
whether juveniles must register. However, on its face, the law is limited
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bringing juveniles within the purview of the law, Section 943.0435(11)
provides the potential for a decreased registration duration of only ten
years for those individuals who were eighteen or younger at the time of
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consequences, DAILY TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.dailytribune.
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political, or scientific value. See id. at 27. The Court went on to warn the
states that no one should be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating
state law, as written or construed. See id. at 27.
87
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
88
See Ferber, 485 U.S. 747, 749-53.
89
See id. at 751-52.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 753.
92
See id. at 756-74.
93
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-62 (1982). First, a state’s
interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
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